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Stability maintenance at the grassroots: China’s weiwen apparatus as a form of con-
flict resolution 
Jonathan Benney, Visiting Fellow, LOEWE Research Focus, Goethe University Frankfurt
1 
Introduction 
This working paper explores the history and potential of “stability maintenance
2” (weiwen) as 
a form of conflict resolution
3 in China. Its emphasis on conflict resolution is novel. Previous 
examinations of the weiwen apparatus have concentrated on its political function, namely to 
manage resistance within society and maintain the authority of the party-state. This avenue 
of investigation has proved fruitful as a means of characterising the political motivation and 
the higher-level strategies involved in stability maintenance. Nonetheless, there remain sig-
nificant conceptual and empirical gaps relating to how stability maintenance offices and 
processes actually function, particularly out of larger cities and at local levels. The research 
described in this paper aims to consider the effectiveness of stability maintenance as a part 
of the “market” for conflict resolution in local China, and to test the hypothesis that conflict 
resolution as facilitated by weiwen is the most pragmatic and effective means of actually re-
solving conflicts in the current Chinese political context, notwithstanding the closeness of the 
stability maintenance discourse to state authority and its relative distance from rule of law-
based methods of dispute resolution. 
The paper synthesises several sources of research. Its argument relies in part on an analysis 
of 65 cases, reported in the Chinese media, of conflict resolution facilitated in whole or in part 
by stability maintenance offices (weiwenban). It juxtaposes this data with an analysis of the 
existing literature, both on weiwen specifically and on the linked concept of weiquan (rights 
defence). Furthermore, the paper considers—to a greater extent than previous English-
language publications have done—the indigenous Chinese discourse on weiwen and stability 
maintenance policy-making. While such discourse must be regarded with a critical eye, vari-
ous recent reports of stability maintenance work at grassroots level lead this paper to con-
sider a second hypothesis: that stability maintenance work has stimulated innovation in local 
government in China. 
The paper thus confronts a number of key issues in modern Chinese studies. It explores the 
means by which Chinese citizens confront their changing world in a political system based on 
“fragmented authoritarianism” (Mertha, 2009) or “bargained authoritarianism” (Lee and 
Zhang, 2013). Its findings provide extra data to support the observations made by other writ-
ers about China’s retreat from legal methods and its complex strategies to facilitate local con-
flict resolution. It also addresses the complicated network of connections between the cen-
tral, provincial and local levels of government, in particular the practical and ideological ef-
                                                           
1 Now Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for US-China Issues, University of Oklahoma (benney@ou.edu). I offer my 
sincere thanks to the administrative and academic staff at the LOEWE Research Focus and the Goethe Univer-
sity, who provided the time and resources which facilitated much of the research in this paper. I must also thank 
Mr Andrew Yeo (currently a postgraduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science) for 
his invaluable research assistance. 
2 I am translating weiwen (维稳) as “stability maintenance” (as Lee and Zhang (2013) and Kan (2013) have done). 
It is also translated frequently as “stability preservation” (as in Feng (2013) and Trevaskes (2013)). It would be 
misleading to suggest that there are substantial differences in nuance between these two translations, but I have 
used “stability maintenance” because I feel that it better conveys the unchanging political outlook of the party-
state with respect to stability. 
3 The terms “dispute resolution“ and “conflict resolution” will be used interchangeably below. While legal scholar-
ship in English tends to refer to “dispute resolution”, academics from other disciplines (and the staff of the LOEWE 
Research Focus) sometimes use “conflict resolution”. This inevitably leads to an overlap in use of the two terms. 
For the purposes of this paper, I do not intend to convey any difference in meaning between the two terms. 3 
 
fects of top-down campaigns, of targets imposed on local government by the centre, and the 
amount of freedom and innovation which the centre and the provinces permit local authori-
ties. 
The analysis in this paper begins by briefly situating stability maintenance in its historical 
context, as a means both of characterising the uses of the stability discourse in China and of 
explaining the structure of the stability maintenance apparatus at local, regional, and central 
levels. The paper then turns to questions of conflict resolution. Using the cases mentioned 
above, it assesses the effectiveness of weiwen strategies in resolving conflicts, particularly in 
comparison to the other available options, chief amongst them legal proceedings and media-
tion. The paper concludes by assessing three key ideas: the place of weiwen in a Chinese 
society where other means of conflict resolution are increasingly marginalised; the available 
space for local innovation and experimentation in forms of conflict resolution in an authoritar-
ian milieu; and the prospects for legal conflict resolution and the rule of law in the era of sta-
bility maintenance. In examining each of these areas, it argues that stability maintenance has 
the potential to assist, as well as hinder, conflict resolution. 
Weiwen as part of the Chinese stability discourse 
In studying the concept of stability in China, our constant challenge is to distinguish between 
three things which are easily conflated: stability as an official discourse; stability as measured 
empirically; and “stability maintenance” as a series of practical functions. As Sandby-Thomas 
(2011) has pointed out, stability in post-Mao China has functioned as a “cognitive filter” or 
framing device: the party-state has used “stability” as a justification for its responses to cur-
rent events and increasingly for its policy-making, a strategy congruent with Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous maxim “wending dadao yiqie” (stability above everything else). This stability dis-
course arose for multiple reasons: as a reaction to growing dissent in China, as a means of 
characterising the party-state’s departure from Maoism, and as a response to China’s eco-
nomic growth and its consequent need for reliable commercial-legal processes. 
In this case, the state strategy is to conflate different types of stability, referring to all of them 
with an umbrella label: Sandby-Thomas (2011, p. 155) refers to this as “mystifying” the no-
tion of stability, allowing it to be “discursively flexible”. The discourse of “stability” and conse-
quently of “stability maintenance” implicitly implies that “national stability” (that is, the political 
stability of the central party-state), economic stability, social stability and psychological stabil-
ity are all essentially fungible, and that increases or decreases in one form of stability will 
lead to parallel increases or decreases in the other forms. The empirical evidence does not 
support this conclusion. While China’s levels of political stability, both at a national and inter-
national level, have remained very high since the beginning of the reform period, and while 
China’s economic growth has generally been steady, one consequence of the high levels of 
these types of stability has been a substantial increase in social instability, as manifested, for 
example, in very high levels of “mass incidents” and other forms of public protest (Lee, 
2007), as well as a steady increase in crime (Xie, 2012, p. 4). Emotional stability, a psycho-
logical outlook often promoted by the state and closely associated with the discourse of “civi-
lisation” (Tomba, 2009), has also suffered as reform has gone on: in fact, various authors 
have characterised modern China as a fundamentally “angry society”, suffused with an un-
targeted “abstract anger” (Zheng, 2012; Yu, 2009a). 
At a broad discursive level, then, the construction of the neologism weiwen 维稳 (an abbre-
viation for weihu wending 维护稳定), and its conceptual application to the problems that 
China faces, reflects the dual concern of the Chinese state: to maintain the political stability 
of the central government and address the many areas of instability at the local level. How-
ever, local sources of instability take many forms, whereas the genealogy of stability mainte-4 
 
nance is chiefly political. The highest administrative organisation for the management of sta-
bility maintenance, the Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work 
(Zhongyang Weiwen Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu 中央维稳工作领导小组) was formed as a re-
sponse to a substantially political problem: the perceived challenge of Falun Gong, and later 
other “evil cults”, to the party-state’s authority (Xie, 2012, pp. 18-19; Zhang and Yi, 2009).  
That said, the Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work is tightly inte-
grated with a larger and much more complex political apparatus, which can be collectively 
characterised as implementing the state policy of “comprehensive management of public 
security” (shehui zhian zonghe zhili 社会治安综合治理, abbreviated “CMS” in English). This 
policy, developed in the early 2000s under the leadership of Hu Jintao, incorporated existing 
strategies for crime prevention and social control (for example, the “strike hard” anti-crime 
campaigns) with a range of new and intensified strategies characterised by their emphasis 
on local communities and on non-legal measures, such as the increased use of informants 
and the targeted monitoring of particular groups (Xie, 2012, pp. 9-11). Many of the policy 
aspects of CMS were not inherently new, nor was the CMS label. Its broader significance is 
the shift in emphasis away from the legal promotion discourse of the 1990s to the facilitation 
of local conflict resolution strategies based on political, financial and personal imperatives, a 
trend characterised by Minzner (2011 and 2013) as a “turn against law”. 
As a result of this, in tandem with the many other CMS groups, the work performed under the 
aegis of the Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work penetrates to 
most sectors of Chinese life. The types of work done are highly diffuse, and it is difficult to 
assess exactly what is and is not covered by the label weiwen. Academically speaking, this 
has led to an over-emphasis on the political aspect of stability maintenance, and particularly 
on the punishment of political dissidents, perhaps because of the political origins of the sta-
bility maintenance concept. The resulting analysis is not of course inherently wrong, but can 
lead to a misunderstanding of the nature of the weiwen policy. For example, Kan (2013, pp. 
90-92) proposes an extremely broad interpretation of weiwen work, categorising the re-
education through labour (laojiao) scheme, the forcible sending of citizens to mental hospi-
tals, and unofficial detention centres (“black jails”) as all being specific manifestations of wei-
wen. Although each of these strategies does have the effect of “maintaining stability” from 
the state’s point of view, although they are ultimately administered by the CMS apparatus, 
and while it is certainly feasible that weiwen personnel have been responsible for this work at 
various times and places, it seems misleading to refer to these strategies as straightforwardly 
being weiwen. Rather, they are better interpreted as manifestations of the CMS policy appa-
ratus, or, even more broadly, of state authoritarianism. A more specific approach to stability 
maintenance work which does not tar all social management activities with the weiwen 
brush, as adopted in the recent article by Lee and Zhang (2013), seems more likely to be 
fruitful as a mode of analysis. 
Consequently, this paper concentrates on those strategies explicitly labelled as weiwen, im-
plemented by weiwenban, and with clearly traceable conceptual links to the state’s weiwen 
policy. The structure for implementing weiwen is now well established across China. At the 
highest policy level, the Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work in-
teracts and shares members with the Central Comprehensive Management Committee and 
the Central Politico-Legal Committee. At a senior administrative level, the Central Office for 
Stability Management interacts with its parallel CMS group, the Central Office for Compre-
hensive Management. The Central Office for Stability Maintenance is then responsible for 
offices for stability maintenance—which operate in tandem with CMS offices, for example 
under the name of “offices for comprehensive management of petitioning and stability”, at 
provincial, county, town and village level (Xu and Li, 2011). 5 
 
There are two key aspects to this organisational structure. The first is its administrative sepa-
rateness from the main Chinese state organs of law enforcement: in particular, the Ministry of 
Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the courts and procuratorate system, the po-
lice, and the coordinating National Office for Letters and Petitions (Xu and Li, 2011). The 
second key aspect, in part a consequence of the first, is the flexible structure and personnel 
that the weiwen organisations can have. At a senior level, the office can recruit staff from 
anywhere and has no fixed office (Nanfeng chuang, 2009). At a local level, as I discuss be-
low, the lack of provision of operational guidelines (as distinct from conflict resolution targets) 
for stability maintenance processes has meant that the strategies used by local stability 
maintenance offices can differ substantially from place to place. However, in general terms, 
each weiwen office is staffed by five to ten official staff (often transferred from other duties) 
and relies on networks of informers (信息员 xinxiyuan) and volunteers (治安志愿者 zhian 
zhiyuanzhe) who alert the staff to relevant matters (Fu, 2013, p. 29). 
The organisational structure of stability maintenance is reflective of the overall trends in Chi-
nese political organisation. The stability maintenance structure combines an authoritative 
top-down approach (reflective of the party-state’s fundamental unwillingness to cede its 
power) with an increasingly free rein provided to local officials (reflective of the increasing 
complexity and pluralism of the Chinese economic and social world, largely as a result of 
economic reform). Furthermore, the stability maintenance apparatus reflects China’s so-
called “turn against law”, as is demonstrated by its structural separateness from the courts 
and even the police. Lee and Zhang (2013, pp. 1480-1) characterise the new processes of 
stability maintenance as reflecting “legal-bureaucratic absorption”. This idea signifies that 
forms of conflict resolution that might (whether hypothetically or in the past) have involved 
explicitly legal processes are increasingly being channelled into purely bureaucratic or gov-
ernmental structures: hence, disinterested and regulated legal processes (whether or not 
these ever actually existed in China) are replaced by negotiated “bargains” between citizen 
and state, with a consequent orientation towards personalised and clientelist forms of state-
society interaction. 
It is clear, then, that stability maintenance work—as carried out on the ground and not solely 
at a broad policy level or in extreme cases—involves a negotiative form of balance between 
a top-down form of state authoritarianism and a bottom-up range of ad hoc local strategies. 
Analysts of stability maintenance have largely acknowledged the authoritarian aspect of wei-
wen. It has been the chief focus of a number of Western studies of stability in China (see 
Feng, 2013; Kan, 2013; Schucher, 2013; Trevaskes, 2013; and Xie and Shan, 2011, for ex-
ample). Only very recently has the flexible side of weiwen attracted academic attention. Lee 
and Zhang (2013) provide the first genuinely sophisticated analysis of stability maintenance 
as it is carried out in an everyday practical form, and their conclusions provide an analytical 
backbone for the cases described below. Even so, their overall characterisation of stability 
maintenance as “bargained authoritarianism” risks conflating two imperatives—namely, the 
desire of the state to avoid resistance, and the necessity that the state negotiate situations 
with its citizens at a local level—which, while closely linked, are sometimes discrete and in 
fact sometimes clash with each other.  
By emphasising the interconnection of state and market in China, the state’s intention to “de-
politicise” life as it is experienced in local terms by citizens, and the importance of interper-
sonal and clientelist relationships to problem-solving in China, Lee and Zhang argue persua-
sively for stability maintenance as a natural process or consequence of modern Chinese au-
thoritarianism. Nonetheless, as the cases discussed below begin to demonstrate, bargaining 
and negotiation is not necessarily a direct or inherent consequence of Chinese authoritarian-
ism, and there are many cases where the state (whether local or central) does not intervene 6 
 
in areas of public unrest, or even facilitates complaint
4. In examining and analysing stability 
maintenance across the totality of cases in which it is used (particularly in non-urban cases, 
and cases which are more like interpersonal conflicts than political unrest), it can blur the key 
issues, and indeed unnecessarily colour the process of thinking about weiwen, to suggest 
that every feature of stability maintenance is inherently linked to authoritarianism, even in 
some mitigated form. Hence, by concentrating on stability maintenance as a form of conflict 
resolution, this paper posits an alternative view: one which is not mutually exclusive with 
other analyses of stability maintenance, but rather intends to shed light on it from a different 
angle. 
The world of conflict resolution in modern China 
As I indicate above, conflict in China—interpersonal, inter-organisation, and between citizen 
and state—is increasing rapidly. In tandem with the “fragmentation” and increasing pluralism 
of Chinese society—including such factors as the diversification of economic stakeholders, 
the privatisation of previously state-supplied services, the demise of the work unit system, 
and the increasingly diversity of communication in media and the Internet—there are now 
more potential conflicts between people and groups of people, and more ways of expressing 
dissatisfaction, than ever before. The sheer size and scale of these conflicts has necessi-
tated various policy innovations by the state, of which the weiwen discourse is one. 
I have already noted that collective conflicts, such as labour disputes, strikes, street marches 
and group political activism, have been closely linked with stability maintenance by many 
scholars; and that, in contrast, this paper aims to examine conflict in China from a more per-
sonalised, grassroots view. In particular, the research in this paper considers small-scale, 
less controversial cases. Such cases, in the Western world, might be subject to non-legal or 
expedited legal resolution, using means such as small claims tribunals or alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods, such as mediation. It is not the aim of this paper to consider the 
state’s response to the so-called “mass incidents” (quntixing shijian 群体性事件) involving 
large collectives, which have attracted so much academic attention over the past decade. 
The incidents examined below are consciously not “mass” in nature
5. 
This narrowing of focus does not simplify the question of how conflicts are resolved in mod-
ern China. Rather, it complicates it. Applied at an individual level, conflict resolution methods 
become even more diffuse. Reports are less likely to reach public attention and scrutiny, 
even through informal means like blogs. The potential for informal solutions—involving 
                                                           
4 A previous article (Benney, 2012) discusses means by which local activists might avoid the censure of the cen-
tral government (although the activist described in the article was detained earlier this year, and has now moved 
to a larger city). Hassid (2012) suggests that online discussion is a consciously maintained “safety valve” for dis-
sent, whereas Woodman (2012) suggests that contentious political discussion is facilitated in a context of “seg-
mented publics” (that is, in particular groups which can be isolated from the public as a whole, contentious dia-
logue is much more likely to take place). In a more general sense, Kelly (2006) describes the state’s technique of 
“fang” and “shou” (“releasing” and “bringing in”), which has been applied to public intellectual discourse: in es-
sence, this involves the state deliberately allowing citizens to express controversial views and then using the 
opinions thus expressed either to alter policy or to target and victimise individuals. Beyond all this, the question of 
the resources available to the state for control of its citizens, which are large but still limited, problematizes the 
idea of state intervention. 
5 Su and He (2010, p. 162) indicate that “the official term to describe such actions has gone from ‘mobbing 
crowds (暴徒)’ or ‘illegal associations (非法集会)’ to the more neutral ‘mass incidents (群体性事件).’ The new 
terminology serves as a signal of depoliticizing the majority of citizen protests as an inevitable fact of life, ending 
the past taboo that banned any public discussion on the subject.” It is also worth noting that each of these aban-
doned terms emphasises the mass collection of individuals: the size of the incident is emphasised over its specific 
quality or nature, or the particular individuals involved. 7 
 
money or goods changing hands, violence, intimidation, and so on—increases. Family and 
social networks become more important, as do personal characteristics. 
All these tendencies are exacerbated by the changing landscape of conflict resolution in 
China. Since the beginning of the reform period, conflict resolution strategies in China have 
described an arc: first towards, then away from, courts and legal dispute resolution methods. 
As Lubman (1967 and 1997) and Fu and Cullen (2011) have described, Maoist China re-
solved disputes largely through mediation (tiaojie 调解), a process characterised largely by 
interpersonal bargaining and negotiation, albeit with Party officials and judges leading the 
negotiation and maintaining the upper hand. Written laws, rules, and processes carried rela-
tively little weight. Personal influence and moral-political qualities (attributed to the state, to 
good citizens, and so on) were used as the primary justifications for the decisions that were 
arrived upon. In tandem with mediation at local levels, the process of xinfang (信访) or “let-
ters and visits” has historically provided for dissatisfied citizens to appeal to higher authorities 
to intervene in their complaints against local bodies: the most symbolically powerful form of 
this being appeals to the central government, or shangfang (上方). This process is also tradi-
tional in China, and became more regulated in the 1990s (Minzner, 2006). 
This traditional, and characteristically non-legal, framework has changed in two key ways 
during the past two decades. Law, largely for reasons of commercial necessity, became 
more and more important as a means of social regulation during the early 1980s. This ten-
dency gradually spread to interpersonal disputes. Particularly under the leadership of the 
relatively progressive Minister for Justice, Xiao Yang (Fu, 2010, p. 170), China underwent a 
process of “legalisation” (fazhihua 法制化). As part of this, local authorities, including both 
government and quasi-government organisations, were funded, empowered, and encour-
aged to facilitate legal resolutions to problems, for example under the label of the pufa (普法) 
or “legal dissemination” program, and the earlier, government-facilitated stages of the 
weiquan (维权) movement (see Benney, 2013, pp. 41-54). This tendency never extended to 
a wholesale embracing of all the implications of a political system ruled by law—for example, 
the enforcement of the rights and freedoms in China’s constitution. As Keith and Lin (2006, 
pp. 28-30) point out, the reasoning behind the tendency was really a kind of “synthesis” of 
ideas of law, morality and virtue, and state authority. Nonetheless, it is clear that these proc-
esses gave law and lawyers greater conceptual “space” and prestige, while at the same time 
increasing the legal consciousness of citizens. Until the mid-2000s, then, both lawyers and 
citizens often made use of the law and legal rhetoric to frame their complaints, often with the 
tacit support of the state
6. As Michelson’s work (2006 and 2007) demonstrates, these 
changes in framing and discourse strategy did not lead to more than a small fraction of dis-
putes actually ending up in court; regardless, the number of cases referred to courts, to-
gether with the number of trained lawyers and legal practitioners, increased steadily during 
this period. 
Ultimately the party-state has come to perceive “legalisation” as a threat rather than an op-
portunity, and, particularly under the influence of Zhou Yongkang (who, as a former Politburo 
member and a non-lawyer, took much less interest than Xiao Yang in the rule of law and 
court autonomy (see Cohen, 2008; Zang, 2010)), it has embarked upon a “turn against law”. 
The increasing preference for non-legal means of social control (including CMS and the wei-
wen movement) reflects the state’s mistrust of lawyers, legal forms of conflict resolution, and 
the discourse of law as a whole. Courts and lawyers continue to regulate high-level cases, 
                                                           
6 The state’s support of rights defenders like Chen Guangcheng and activist lawyers like Teng Biao was highly 
visible during the early 2000s. In a few years, the state’s attitude towards such activists had turned negative, as 
the well-known case of Chen Guangcheng’s detention and subsequent asylum in the United States demonstrates. 8 
 
particularly in the commercial sphere, but there are now relatively few incentives, and many 
disincentives, for citizens to use the court system to resolve personal disputes. The weiquan 
cases promoted in the Chinese state media during the late 1990s and early 2000s—in which 
vulnerable citizens “used the law as a weapon” to solve labour disputes, cases of domestic 
violence, violations of the rights of the disabled, and so on (see Benney, 2013, pp. 46-7)—
are now very hard to find. Such cases are now, in the opinion of the state, best solved by 
mediation or by a process linked with weiwen. 
At the same time, the xinfang process of petitioning has become considerably less effective. 
During the 1990s, both petitioning and court cases were used more and more frequently. As 
Minzner (2006, p. 86) suggested in the mid-2000s, petitioning played a valuable role in Chi-
nese conflict resolution, both in the sense that it allowed problems to at least reach the atten-
tion of higher levels of government, and also in that it provided a “safety valve” through which 
citizens could express their discontent. At the same time, the state was struggling with the 
question of administration and control of xinfang processes (Minzner, 2006, pp. 89-92). 
However, as Liebman (2011, p. 276) indicates, the number of petitions has been decreasing 
since 2006. This decrease appears largely to be the result of pressure on petitioners from a 
local and national level. There was a “high tide” of petitions from 2003 to 2006, during which 
period thousands of petitioners took the petition principle to its logical conclusion and trav-
elled to Beijing to present their grievances to the central government (a movement which, Li 
et al argue, was stimulated by the changes in central leadership at the time) (Li et al, 2012, 
pp. 317-320).  
In part this “high tide” ended because of the collective realisation by citizens that petitioning 
was not an especially effective way of problem solving: it was “costly, ineffective, and often 
counterproductive” (Li et al, 2012, p. 321). But the suppressive tactics of the state—both at a 
central and a local level—were even more significant. Under the supervision of Zhou Yong-
kang, the then Minister for Public Security, increasingly strict targets for numbers of accept-
able permissions were implemented after 2005. This put pressure on local officials to prevent 
petitioners reaching Beijing, under threat of severe penalties which ranged from fines to 
criminal prosecution (Li et al, 2012, p. 325). Hence the common strategy of representatives 
of local government following petitioners as they travel to Beijing or provincial capitals, in an 
attempt to physically prevent them from lodging their complaints (Chen, 2013, p. 62). 
This new situation forced local authorities to adopt a range of new and highly personalised 
strategies, in attempts to persuade potential petitioners not to make formal complaints. Such 
strategies included compensation and bargaining as well as threats and detention, and un-
derstandably put considerable extra pressure on cadres. These local strategies are concep-
tually labelled in the same way that the State Council’s 2005 directives on petitioning were, 
as means of “stabilising” potential petitioners (Li et al, 2012, p. 330), just as the “hard targets” 
on local government were nominally intended to “maintain political stability” (Li et al, 2012, p. 
325). This is a clear manifestation of the state’s overall policy intention with respect to stabil-
ity maintenance and conflict resolution: namely, to develop a overarching rhetoric based on 
stability, to set strict targets designed to protect the Centre from criticism from citizens, and to 
provide local authorities with relative flexibility in terms of how they meet these targets. 
Finally, to consider the role of mediation in the present landscape of Chinese conflict resolu-
tion. Fu Hualing’s research (Fu, 1992; Fu and Choy, 2004; Fu and Cullen, 2011) has demon-
strated that, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the perceived effectiveness of court-
facilitated forms of mediation decreased. This, coupled with its labour-intensiveness and the 
relative prestige and increased availability of court adjudication, led to a gradual decrease in 
the use of mediation (Lu, 2011, p. 237). Since then, however, the “retreat from law” has given 9 
 
mediation a complex new status. Minzner (2011, p. 945) characterises the approach as an 
attempt to “resuscitate” extra-judicial mediation practices that had “fallen into disrepair” with 
the rise of law during the 1980s and 1990s. The People’s Mediation Law, enacted in 2010, 
forms part of this attempt to codify and re-emphasise mediation as a form of dispute resolu-
tion. The law notes the historical embeddedness of mediation into Chinese dispute resolution 
and provides specifically for various permitted forms of mediation—people's mediation, 
commercial mediation, administrative mediation, employment dispute mediation and industry 
mediation—each covered by its own set of laws and procedures. 
For the purposes of this paper, the processes of administrative mediation and people’s me-
diation are most significant. The 2010 law represents the culmination of a series of reforms 
which Halegua (2005) had characterised as a attempt to revivify the People’s Mediation 
Commissions (PMCs) so prevalent during the Mao period. The law sets out various require-
ments for the makeup of the PMCs, the people allowed to work as people’s mediators, the 
processes of people’s mediation, and mediation agreements. Administrative mediation—that 
is, mediation conducted by administrative organisations, such as disputes relating to land 
administration and demolition, contract disputes, and public security disputes, and marriage 
disputes—on the other hand, does not fall under a single governing law (He and Zeng, 2011, 
pp. 22-3). 
The Chinese party-state’s perspective on local mediation is ambivalent. First, it is clear (as 
Fu and Cullen (2011) and Lu (2011) demonstrate) that complainants are often suspicious of 
mediation, and prefer more sophisticated and legal methods such as adjudication and arbi-
tration, as well as actual lawsuits; this has constantly worked against the state’s attempts to 
promote mediation after the mid-2000s. Second, the state’s attempts to reform local media-
tion still give a great deal of flexibility to the PMCs, who are permitted to (according to Article 
22 of the People’s Mediation Law) “adopt various means to mediate disputes”, and even to 
the participants in the mediation, who may terminate it at any time (according to Article 23). 
Mediation, therefore, can still involve almost anyone and take almost any form. As the cases 
below demonstrate, this has often led to stagnation, both in terms of the composition of 
PMCs and the processes of mediation. Third, administrative mediation, despite involving a 
wide range of serious and increasingly important grassroots issues, has no systematic coor-
dination or regulatory structure. Finally, despite the state’s attempts to prioritise and promote 
mediation, it is still necessary for it also to promote the structure of laws and courts, particu-
larly in higher-level disputes; this, coupled with the continued intellectual promotion of ideas 
such as “rule of law”, means that the state cannot take a consistent discourse position on the 
mediation process. Ali (2013) suggests that mediators themselves are becoming more en-
gaged with the rule of law and are increasingly inclined to incorporate legal ideas and princi-
ples into their work. 
Stability maintenance, therefore, enters the Chinese landscape of dispute resolution as a 
conceptual newcomer. Even if the implementation of stability maintenance in conflict resolu-
tion involves identical processes and personnel to people’s mediation or administrative me-
diation, its novel label may lead to greater public engagement with the dispute resolution 
process. Also, the substantial central funding allocated to weiwen can potentially allow local 
governments to devise new means of dealing with the epidemic of public complaints and 
dissatisfaction. While the distinctions between stability maintenance and mediation, as well 
as the tracing of which government funds are allocated where in practice, is difficult if not 
impossible, the cases described in the next section do begin to provide us with information 
about how stability maintenance is functioning at the grassroots. Specifically, they provide us 
with information which goes some way to answering the two research questions posed at the 
beginning of the paper, namely whether conflict resolution as facilitated by weiwen is the 10 
 
most pragmatic and effective means of actually resolving conflicts in the current Chinese 
political context, and whether stability maintenance work has stimulated innovation in local 
government in China. 
The data 
In late 2012 and early 2013, we made a search of Chinese news databases for reports of 
cases where stability maintenance offices had been involved in the resolution of conflicts
7. 65 
cases were retrieved. The 65 cases included cases where the conflicts was not resolved at 
the time of writing (23 cases), cases where the dispute had been partly resolved (11 cases), 
and cases where it was reported that the dispute had been fully resolved, at least in the short 
term (31 cases). 
Our coding framework (see the Appendix) was intended to clarify the nature of the com-
plaints and the complainants, the location of the complaint, the affiliation of the relevant sta-
bility maintenance office, the type of entity complained about, the type of complaint made by 
the complainant, the time before the stability maintenance office intervened, the method of 
conflict resolution, the entities other than the stability maintenance office involved in the con-
flict resolution, whether the CCP or CCP members were explicitly stated to have been in-
volved, whether the conflict was resolved in the short term, and (if known) the longer-term 
outcomes. 
Despite this pseudo-statistical framework, the main mode of analysis of the data was essen-
tially qualitative and discursive. The data was insufficient, both in quantity and reliability, to 
perform any rigorous technical analysis. In contrast, our discursive analysis of the data pro-
voked us to identify a number of key themes, under which we present our findings below. 
Despite the empirical limitations of this approach, the data—particularly when coupled with 
an analysis of the Chinese academic discourse on stability maintenance—is sufficient to pro-
vide some preliminary answers to the research questions, as well as situating stability main-
tenance more clearly in the academic field of conflict resolution and providing some useful 
illustrative narratives of the conflict resolution process. Just as importantly, the data provides 
us with a useful means of focusing our future study. 
The data is problematised in another important way, in that practically all of the newspaper 
articles we used are sourced from the Chinese media, interlinked to some extent with the 
party-state, and in that many of the academic critiques of stability maintenance processes, 
which we have used in part to analyse the data, come from Party journals or publications 
fundamentally designed to promote the party-state’s agenda, such as policing journals. The 
paper does not proceed on the basis that these articles are straightforward and precise nar-
rations of actual events
8. Rather, the analysis of the data is predicated on the belief that it is 
possible to read Chinese academic and newspaper articles in a number of interlocking ways: 
                                                           
7 To be more specific, we (the author and a research assistant) used five search sources: in order of priority, the 
People’s Daily database, the Chinese Newspaper Database, the Chinese Academic Journal database, Google 
News, and general searches of the web and other social networking services. We retrieved articles by using the 
search term 维稳办 (weiwenban, or stability maintenance office) and filtered the results so that only cases where 
there were conflicts between two or more parties where a weiwenban attempted to facilitate resolution. We re-
trieved articles within a time period beginning with 1 January 2008 and ending with the present (ie, April 2013). 
The filtered articles were coded based on the framework listed in the Appendix. 
8 In a recent article, Tsai and Kao (2013) demonstrate the complexity of the agenda -setting process facilitated by 
“writing teams” in the Chinese state media. Such teams  of authors work collaboratively to promote particular 
points of view, in the process interacting with rival teams who promote different views. While we found no particu-
lar reason to presume that these writing teams wrote any of the articles we analysed, Tsai and Kao’s case study 
demonstrates the sophisticated way in which the party-state uses the media to manage public debate. 11 
 
  within reason, as depictions and critiques of events that actually took place or are tak-
ing place; 
  within reason, as depictions of phenomena which the state would like people to be-
lieve are occurring; 
  as moral-legal narratives designed to encourage citizens and government bodies to 
behave in particular ways (in the style of popular legal and policing publications such 
as Zhuomuniao and Minzhu yu fazhi); and 
  as manipulation of units of state discourse: that is, pieces of writing designed to pro-
mote new terms and ideas, such as weiwen; especially pieces written less to inform 
an audience, but rather for the economic or strategic benefit of the author (for exam-
ple, articles published in order to legitimise a local government organisation, or pub-
lished by academics in order to meet publication quotas). 
In keeping with this approach, we concentrate on the cases not so much as individual units 
of data but rather as pointers which can demonstrate useful themes and trends in the prac-
tice of weiwen as conflict resolution. Therefore, the analytical approach taken below is to 
identify various general headings which we believe best summarise the data we used, and to 
indicate (citing particular cases where necessary) how these trends relate to the data and 
what more general ideas can be deduced from them. 
Such an approach is not a substitute for fieldwork. Rather, it provides different information, 
emphasising how discourse on stability maintenance is formed, negotiated, and expressed in 
different contexts. Regardless whether we take these items of data purely at face value (as 
depictions of actual events) or purely as a tool of the state, we can observe: 
  a nexus between weiwen and conflict resolution, previously unexplored in Western 
academic analysis; 
  cases of innovation in local government, stimulated by weiwen funding; 
  deliberate flexibility and personalisation of disputes, questioning the idea of “rigid 
weiwen” popular in Chinese political discourse; and 
  further shifts in “all-purpose” labels for conflict resolution: from weiquan, to xinfang, 
shangfang, tiaojie, and weiwen. 
As the figure below demonstrates, the 65 cases originated from sources across China, with a 
particular bias towards the Pearl River Delta, which, as other authors have observed (Lee 
and Zhang, 2013), has experienced a particularly high level of stability maintenance cases. 
We observed a reasonable balance between large cities and smaller population centres, and 
























Figure 1: The 65 analysed cases, plotted on a map of China. 
The trends 
This section identifies five key areas—compensation, fresh starts, informality of negotiation, 
interaction with other bodies, and practical facilitation—which were apparent from the cases. 
Specific cases are identified when useful. 
Compensation 
As Lee and Zhang (2013) and Zhuo (2013) have demonstrated, the process of compensation 
and financial exchange is key to stability maintenance. Both modern and traditional tenden-
cies in Chinese state-society relations have paved the way for finance-based conflict resolu-
tion. Zhuo contextualises the rise of weiwen, particularly at grassroots level, as being a logi-
cal progression of the development of a profit-making model for townships and villages: that 
is, the gradually increasing economic independence of the township and village leaderships, 
such that local leaders have become “profit-making model regime executives” (moulixing 
zhengquan jingyingzhe), clashing with their traditional role in conflict resolution (Zhuo, 2013, 
p. 42). Such a policy approach, it is argued, has led to a situation where local governments 
have drifted away from the “service model” (where their basic role is seen as providing ser-
vices to citizens) and towards a purely profit-making model, a natural consequence of which 
has been increased fees for services and increased disputes over such fees (Zhuo, 2013, p. 
42). 
Lee and Zhang extend this analysis by situating it conceptually in what is termed the “micro-
foundations of authoritarian domination” in a post-state socialist era. They suggest that ten-
dencies which were apparent before the reform period—the patron-client relationship within 
the Chinese Communist state, the tacit “hidden bargaining” characteristic of socialist eco-
nomic relations, and the “bureaucratic absorption” of legal functions by party-state bodies—
are just as apparent within the stability maintenance regime (Lee and Zhang, 2013, p. 1478-
1481). The major shift that they identify is that the bargaining now takes place on a more 
abstract financial plane, a phenomenon known in everyday language as huaqian mai ping’an 
or “buying stability” (Lee and Zhang, 2013, p. 1485). The cases of stability maintenance-
based conflict resolution which attract most popular interest are those which involve the 
transfer of funds. Tang (2010), for example, discusses cases where sums of money have 13 
 
been used by weiwenban to break up fights and to compensate complainants who make 
complaints without any legal basis (for example, forcing a woman’s former boyfriend to pay 
for the “loss of youthfulness” incurred by the woman after she had an abortion). 
This tendency was borne out in the cases we analysed, although not to the very high extent 
suggested by the authors quoted above. In twelve of the 65 cases, it was reported that the 
stability maintenance office required the entity being complained about to pay compensation; 
in two others, it was reported that compensation was settled upon between the parties in-
volved after a drawn-out process of discussion and mediation; in one other case (in Beiliu 
city, the stability maintenance system of which will be discussed below), it was reported that 
the stability maintenance office had voluntarily paid a sum of money to the family of a youth 
who had died while saving a drowning villager (Jin, 2012). In some cases the sums involved 
were very high: one case, in Sanya city in Anhui province, a family was paid ¥200,000 com-
pensation after they blocked a busy highway when a relative was killed in a traffic accident 
(Song, 2012). This is not to say that only these twelve cases were resolved on a financial 
basis—many of the cases were resolved by the stability maintenance apparatus requiring 
organisations, such as companies, to pay outstanding wages or fees which they previously 
owed other people. 
Cases such as this do demonstrate the extent to which local governments are prepared to 
draw from “stability maintenance funds” in order to prevent conflicts reaching the stage at 
which they must be resolved by courts or petitioning, and to prevent larger-scale mass inci-
dents or long drawn-out public displays of dissent from occurring—a key principle of Xie 
(2012)’s analysis of stability maintenance. Nonetheless, it must still be acknowledged that in 
many of the cases we considered, financial compensation did not figure very highly. Two 
potential conclusions—neither mutually exclusive with the other—may flow from this. One is 
that, at a grass-roots level where the stability maintenance office is dealing with relatively 
small interpersonal conflicts, the strategy of financial compensation is used less frequently 
than in large-scale conflicts in larger cities with larger stability maintenance funds. Instead, 
negotiative strategies, characteristic both of traditional mediation and PMC-facilitated media-
tion, are used more frequently.  
Second, it is possible that financial compensation is just as common a strategy as the field-
work research performed by the authors above indicates, but that it is not emphasised when 
weiwen cases are reported in the media. This would suggest an interesting tendency: that 
the state is willing to maintain a policy of compensation as the backbone of stability mainte-
nance, but intends to frame stability maintenance as a quasi-mediation form of interpersonal 
negotiated conflict resolution, either as a response to the academic criticisms of weiwen de-
scribed below, or as a means of suggesting to the public that the weiwen process of dispute 
resolution is negotiative and facilitative rather than merely financial.  
The key to Zhuo’s discussion of weiwen bargaining, which he analyses using the language of 
game theory, is information asymmetry (Zhuo, 2013, p. 43-44): the local state has more in-
formation about what compensation is possible in a given situation than any complainants, 
because it is able to communicate with higher levels of government and because it has more 
information about similar cases taking place in other locations. It is thus more likely that the 
state will obtain a financial outcome closer to its preferred outcome (that is, minimising their 
own costs) than that individual complainants will get an amount of compensation that is close 
to what they initially wanted. Given that the state possesses this extra negotiation power, it is 
feasible that it is in their interests to promote the negotiative aspect of stability maintenance, 
as extended negotiation is likely to shift the outcomes in their favour. While this is hypotheti-
cally possible, and may be a strategy which is occurring in various places, it is not particularly 14 
 
consistent with the obvious fact that the compensation aspect of stability maintenance-based 
conflict resolution is well known, and of course motivates many complainants to make com-
plaints. Overall, however, in spite of these ambiguities, the data do seem to suggest that the 
influence of compensation is less than Western academics have previously observed, and 
that it is possible for the weiwen process to take place without financial compensation neces-
sarily occurring. 
Fresh starts 
In several of the reported cases, it was suggested that the stability maintenance apparatus 
provided a novel means of resolving disputes that had dragged on for a long time. In such 
cases, complainants either sought the stability maintenance offices out, or the offices inter-
vened themselves. In representative cases, a dispute over the remuneration of some hotel 
workers, which had gone on for four years without any particular resolution, was resolved by 
the intervention of a weiwenban at the behest of the city government, apparently to the great 
acclaim of the public (Lü, 2013); and a long-running dispute between farmers over the sale of 
pigs was referred by the local police station to the local weiwenban, which was able to liaise 
with the police and the complainants to resolve the problem to the satisfaction of all (Xiong, 
2013). 
While they are intended to make the point that the stability maintenance process is effective 
as a negotiative facilitator of dispute resolution, it is also clear from the articles that existing 
processes of dispute resolution, in particular quasi-legal processes like mediation and adju-
dication, have a tendency to stagnate, in that there are increasingly fewer options that the 
mediating bodies may offer the complainants, and in that the personnel involved in the me-
diation may lack the skills required to listen to both parties and to develop suitable outcomes. 
In this context, the benefit of the weiwen process is first that it is relatively new and has been 
heavily promoted, and second that it is well funded, allowing its staff to facilitate a wider 
range of mediation strategies, of course including financial compensation. 
Informality of negotiation 
As compared to the methods of dispute resolution promoted during the 1980s and 1990s, 
such as legal proceedings, petitioning, and judicial mediation and adjudication, the process 
of dispute resolution as facilitated by stability maintenance offices is characterised by its in-
formality. In this way it is conceptually close both to the recent mediation reforms in China, 
particularly the use of People’s Mediation Committees (see Ali, 2013), as well as to the me-
diation techniques characteristic of the Mao period (see Lubman, 1997; Fu, 1992). There are 
very few structures and rules governing mediation processes, amounts of compensation, 
strategies for communication, lengths of time required, interaction with other bodies, and so 
on. Jin and Zhao (2012, p. 98-9) suggest that weaknesses in the weiwen process are often a 
result of the limited strategic knowledge of local governments, who tend to use either com-
pensation or violent strategies on the grounds that they have little training in other forms of 
mediation
9. Further, this informality has led to the predominance of bargaining discussed by 
Lee and Zhang and Zhuo. 
A characteristic case of this bargaining, alluded to above, concerns a young woman who, 
after she had had an abortion, sought ¥80,000 compensation from her former boyfriend for 
“loss of youthfulness”. The man only wanted to pay ¥10,000. The weiwenban assigned the 
                                                           
9 The difficulty of untrained staff performing weiwen processes and writing weiwen reports (such as the weiwen 
gongzuo zongjie (or yearly “stability maintenance work summary”) has led to the publication of specially designed 
software designed to aid the work of stability maintenance officials (tujian.org, 2011). It is also possible to find 
templates for stability maintenance reports online. 15 
 
head of the local police to discuss matters with the man: “no-one knows what they said” dur-
ing their meeting, but the man subsequently agreed to pay ¥30,000 to the woman and 
¥9,000 to the weiwenban as a “coordination fee” (Tang, 2010). The arbitrariness of this bar-
gaining, as well as its lack of transparency, has often been regarded as detrimental to the 
process of conflict resolution as a whole, as well as, in Lee and Zhang’s language, being a 
means by which the state can resist and mediate threats to its authority. 
Nonetheless, it can still be argued that the very flexibility of this process can have positive 
effects. As in the case above, it can provide remedies where individuals have been damaged 
in some way but where there is no obvious legal recourse for their injury (a problem which 
Abel (1990) argues in his famous critique of tort law is a characteristic of rapidly changing 
and fragmenting capitalist societies). It allows remedies to be tailored to the particular partici-
pants in the conflict, allowing for—in contrast to legal methods—more flexible forms of rem-
edy than financial compensation, such as apologies or restitution, and allowing these to be 
negotiated between the parties.  
Three example cases from our data, each with a medical orientation, demonstrate this ten-
dency. In one case, in Shenzhen in 2012 (Li Hongmei, 2012), a hospital agreed (after a “dia-
logue” with the weiwenban) to provide free treatment to a man who needed corrective sur-
gery after he lost an eye in an operation provided at the hospital. A second case, also in 
Shenzhen (Tong, 2013), involved community protest at the risk of infection spreading from a 
proposed women’s and children’s hospital. After negotiation, it was agreed that the hospital 
would not handle infectious diseases, and it would be built 34 metres away from other build-
ings, more than the legal minimum standard of 20 metres. Third, in a case from Guangzhou 
(Zhou, 2013), a hospital agreed to pay ¥350,000 compensation to the family of a man who 
had died during a blood transfusion. 
It is particularly apparent that these processes are incongruent with Western notions of the 
“rule of law”, and the application of the rule of law in the Chinese context. For example, 
closed-door negotiations violate the principle of transparency, by which it is deemed that de-
cision-makers’ processes of reasoning should be made obvious to outside observers (see 
Peerenboom, 2002, p. 425). Forms of negotiation which are dependent on what the various 
parties involved believe, what they can contribute, or how much bargaining power they have 
risks violating the principle of consistency (that is, the idea that legal decisions should be 
predictable and similar in similar cases), which is also held to be a key to the rule of law 
(Schweitzer et al., 2007, p. 621-2). However, acknowledging this deficiency does not auto-
matically or wholly invalidate these informal negotiation processes, particularly given the lack 
of financial and human resources devoted in China to the development of the legal system, 
and the correspondingly high level of resources given to the stability maintenance project. 
Essentially, then, the potential critique of this aspect of weiwen remains very similar to Fu’s, 
Lubman’s, and Ali’s critique of mediation, namely that it can and does play a role in local 
Chinese communities without necessarily being as consistent with legal principles as outside 
observers would desire. 
Interaction with other bodies 
One aspect of the stability maintenance apparatus which has been specifically promoted in 
the state media is its ability to link and coordinate with other government bodies. Being ad-
ministratively separate from the courts, police, procuratorate, and so on, but frequently shar-
ing staff and facilities with these, has evidently provided weiwenban with a novel form of co-
ordination power. As one user was reported to have said: 
“Before, if people wanted to go to the government, or get divorced, or if they had a 
dispute, they didn’t know who to go to. They would have to go to the secretary of the 16 
 
mayor. Now they know to go to the weiwenban, who can pass on the problem to the 
right people.” (Tang, 2010) 
This tendency, or at least the desire of the state media to promote stability maintenance as a 
“one-stop shop” for conflict resolution, was evident in many of the cases we studied. There 
were only six of the 65 cases in which no other government organisation was reported to 
have been involved in the conflict resolution process. First, there was an obvious overlap 
between the architecture of the People’s Mediation Committees and between the work done 
by the weiwenban. When tiaojie (mediation) is referred to in the cases, it was often difficult or 
impossible to ascertain whether the PMC or the weiwenban, or both, was facilitating the me-
diation. 
In resolving conflicts, the stability maintenance apparatus worked closely with local Public 
Security Bureaus, judicial offices, district courts, Politics and Law Committees, city develop-
ment boards, economic and trade bureaus, housing construction bureaus, village committees 
and local government, as well as quasi-government organisations such as the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, together with the People’s Mediation Committees and other 
specialised mediation committees such as medical dispute mediation committees. This is not 
an exhaustive list, but rather is intended to represent the extent to which the stability mainte-
nance engages with other government bodies. Xie (2013) makes the point that the very lim-
ited funding provided to local police means that the stability maintenance apparatus, which is 
sometimes better funded, can act as a de facto police force, although often over-spending on 
weiwen has had a damaging effect on local budgets. 
The interaction also takes many forms. Apart from the evident ability of the weiwenban to 
refer its clients to the local body which can best fit their needs, the government organisations 
which cooperate with the stability maintenance apparatus can interact with weiwenban during 
the conflict resolution process (as is common with the Public Security Bureaus and local 
governments), as well as acting as a supervisor for the remedies that the weiwenban intends 
to enforce—for example, after a labour dispute with a bus company, the bus drivers and 
company came to a consensus, and the drivers agreed to go back to work. Facilitated by the 
weiwenban, in tandem with the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (both at district level), the bus company promised changes to the 
drivers’ work contracts. The District Labour Department (qu laodong bumen) was enlisted to 
enforce and supervise these changes (Wei, 2013). 
Practical facilitation 
Since the stability maintenance apparatus has such a high level of access to other govern-
ment bodies, and since the process of conflict resolution is so fundamentally negotiative and 
non-legal, the weiwenban’s role tends to be extremely practical and facilitative. In contrast to 
the Western legal system, there is very little attempt to develop general decision-making 
principles or precedents which can be applied in more than one case. However, this does not 
simply extend to the flexible provision of financial compensation. As part of the bargaining 
process, the stability maintenance apparatus allows for the construction of complex facilita-
tive solutions to problems.  
Examples of these processes include mandating apologies in situations where official bodies 
have made mistakes, such as cremating the wrong body (Zhang, 2012; Taizhou ribao, 2012); 
promoting “rational patriotism” in a case where anti-Japanese protests by school students 
were perceived as having got out of hand (Li Qiping, 2012); requesting that children provide 
their elderly mother with “spiritual care” as well as money (she had been attempting to bring 
a lawsuit to require this) (Nandu wang, 2013); and many cases where weiwenban have 17 
 
spearheaded or mandated the investigation by police or local government of cases of crimi-
nal conduct or financial deception. 
This strategic approach is consistent with the Chinese “retreat from law” and the localised 
approach characteristic of the weiwen apparatus, as well as the recent tendency to make 
mediation less legalistic and more practical and facilitative. Nonetheless it is worth mention-
ing it specifically, as it demonstrates that the work done by stability maintenance organisa-
tions is not confined to financial compensation or bargaining between individuals. Further, 
even if the cases mentioned above are relatively infrequent, or if their reports have been ex-
aggerated or constructed by the media, it is still possible to observe some vestiges of weiwen 
being taken at “face value”—that is, as a series of schemes for increasing the level of stabil-
ity in society.  
Policy debates 
As mentioned above, Western writers have tended to attribute the stability maintenance ap-
paratus with unitary aims—namely, as a form of “domestic coercion” (Xie, 2013, p. 80). On a 
structural level this is inconsistent with the highly localised—and thus highly diverse —
organisation of stability maintenance offices, and on an empirical level, the cases above 
demonstrate somewhat more diversity in the implementation of the basic principles of stabil-
ity maintenance. Further to this, it is evident that critiques of weiwen from Chinese authors 
are having some effect on the practice of stability maintenance, particularly at local levels. 
Kelly (2013, p. 52-3) identifies a key moment in the Chinese state’s attitude to weiwen: the 
publication, in July 2010, of a special issue of Renmin Luntan (or “People’s Forum”, an off-
shoot of the People’s Daily, reflective of the opinions of high-level Party officials) which pre-
sented critiques of the implementation of stability maintenance policy. The articles in this 
issue, particularly those by Sun Liping and Yang Yiyong, interact with a separate article pub-
lished in 2009 by Yu Jianrong to form the basis for a critique of stability maintenance prac-
tices which is continuing to have an impact at local level. Three key concepts have attracted 
particular attention: Yu’s “rigid stability” versus “flexible stability” (Yu, 2009); Sun’s “spectre of 
instability” and “stability maintenance vicious circle” (Sun, 2010); and Yang’s criticism of 
“movement-based stability maintenance” (Yang, 2010). While these particular articles are 
short and not very empirical, they have stimulated considerable academic discussion, and I 
use the practical response to this academic debate to test the hypothesis that local stability 
maintenance offices are acting as catalysts for innovation in local government practice. 
Yu’s concept of “rigid stability” (gangxing wending 刚性稳定) refers in essence to the idea 
that non-political protest is being interpreted by the state as being political and handled politi-
cally. Many mass incidents, he argues, are in fact cases of “anger venting” based on local 
incompetence and the perception by local citizens that they lack the ability to participate in 
the management of their own affairs. In response to this, he suggests that the state has 
taken a “high tension” approach (Yu, 2009, p. 115) characterised by suppression of public 
opinion, and a reliance on state violence and control as a means of government organisa-
tion—while at the same time the methods and the vigour with which the public expresses its 
opinions have increased. Flexible stability, he suggests, is characterised by decentralisation 
and “micro-politics”, where social conflicts at a local level are treated negotiatively by the 
state, and accepted as a normal consequence of social development (Yu, 2009, p. 116-7); 
thus, stability and development can co-exist. 
Sun (2010) conceptualises Yu’s “high tension” society as being characterised by a “phantom 
of instability” (bu wending huanxiang 不稳定幻想)—that is, that a subjective feeling of social 
instability has led to excessively censorious treatment of protest and social conflict. Sun 18 
 
spends some time making the argument that China is not especially unstable: “an increase in 
social problems is a good thing. It means that people are daring to express their demands, 
and society must tolerate and understand this phenomenon.” He criticises the “common 
practice” by government of achieving “short-term stability” by suppressing the expression of 
vulnerable social groups, describing this as a “stability maintenance vicious circle” (weiwen 
guaiquan 维稳怪圈) in which “the more stability maintenance there is, the less stability there 
is” (yue weiwen yue bu wen 越维稳越不稳). Yang (2010) furthers this idea by criticising 
“campaign-based stability maintenance” (yundongshi de weiwen 运动式的维稳) and suggest-
ing that the key to achieving long-term stability is institutional development and maintenance 
rather than severe action in specific circumstances. 
These analyses were largely targeted towards the perceived problem of “mass incidents”. 
Perversely, perhaps, the treatment of mass incidents—characterised by “buying” short-term 
stability to avoid attenuated public conflict—has remained largely the same (as Xie (2012 
and 2013) and Lee and Zhang (2013) have demonstrated), despite the evidence that some 
Party intellectuals doubt that this method is the most effective in the long term. But at lower 
levels of conflict resolution, those not likely to escalate into mass incidents, this academic 
discussion may have had some effect. Local responses to the academic critique of weiwen 
demonstrate a tendency to use the structures and discourse of stability maintenance as a 
means of developing innovations in local government. 
The case of Beiliu city
10 in Guangxi province, described by Yang Yuquan (2012), demon-
strates the interaction that weiwen can have when applied to existing governance structures. 
As described by Yang, Beiliu and particularly Liujing village (the focal point of the case study) 
had suffered from inefficient dispute resolution processes, particularly in view of the fact that 
conflicts had been increasing over time. The dispute resolution process was overseen by the 
“two committees” (liang wei 两委, the term used for the sharing of power between the Com-
munist Party and village committee—see Sun et al (2013)). It was characterised by a lack of 
expertise in the cadres responsible for conflict resolution, and limited enforceability of deci-
sion-making, which resulted in many cases being referred upwards, through petitioning and 
legal action. In short, it had “ceased to function” (shiling 失灵). This “administrative manage-
ment” (zuzhi guanli 组织管理) was invigorated by the introduction of a system of a form of 
grass-roots power known as “harmony associations” (hexie xiehui 和谐协会). 28 harmony 
associations were developed, registered as not-for-profit social groups, and functioning un-
der the direction of the village-level workstation for comprehensive management, letters and 
visits and stability management (cunji zongzhi xinfang weiwen gongzuozhan 村级综治信访维
稳工作站). 
The harmony association project might be described as a form of microfinance for dispute 
resolution. Under the “thought leadership” (sixiang zhidao) of the CCP leadership, the har-
mony associations aimed to distribute responsibility for dispute resolution and develop links 
to community (through “mass propaganda” or qunzhong xuanchuan). The associations re-
ceived a startup fund (a weiwen jijin or stability maintenance fund) of ¥150,000. Rather than 
to compensate complainants, this funding was mostly used to provide greater levels of pay-
ment for mediators. The mediators thus recruited were local people who had gained the re-
                                                           
10 By coincidence I performed fieldwork in the adjacent county in 2012. This fieldwork (concentrating on activism 
rather than dispute resolution) demonstrated that local activists regarded the weiwenban as essentially indistin-
guishable from the local police or the national security apparatus (Benney, 2012, p. 397-8). This does not funda-
mentally contradict Yang’s description of what has happened in Beiliu, especially as my research pertained to the 
“mass incident” focus of weiwen rather than its dispute resolution function, but it does place some doubt on the 
reliability of his findings. When asked by email whether they had heard of the Yulin weiwen strategy, my inform-
ants responded in the negative. 19 
 
spect of the community and were recommended by community members, often retired Party 
members or cadres. Their close links with the community gave them moral authority in me-
diation, and their local knowledge allowed them to negotiate effectively in cases relating to 
property and boundary disputes. Liberating the cadres from the burden of dispute resolution 
improved local relationships, but still provided a means of supervision for “objectivity”. Yang 
suggests that this method has provided a more efficient use of resources by limiting com-
pensation, as well as providing a dispute resolution method which has gained the favour of 
the community. He claims that this is a manifestation of Yu’s “flexible stability”, in that it is 
responsive to the pluralism of the area and aims to reduce the distance between people and 
their government. 
Reports of similar schemes can be found elsewhere in the academic literature: for example, 
the implementation of stability maintenance at grassroots level through “rural village offices” 
(nongshi cunban 农事村办), also in Guangxi (Huang, 2010), and the use of “stability offices” 
to mediate in labour disputes in Henan (Li and Wang, 2009). As Li and Zhao (2012, p. 99) 
identify in a longer reflection on the basic critiques outlined above, these are manifestations 
of a broader need: to stimulate innovation in weiwen practice, to allow such innovation to 
improve local government practice in general, as a response to the increasing complexity of 
society, and to facilitate methods of dispute resolution which promote longer-term stability 
rather than papering over immediate problems with compensation, and causing more prob-
lems later (that is, breaking out of the “stability maintenance vicious circle”). 
These various forms of local innovation do demonstrate that it is possible for the practice of 
stability maintenance—at local level and for personal-level conflicts—both to respond to the 
general criticisms of policy which have been mounted in the past few years and to create 
innovative practices which are consistent both with the demands of the party-state and with 
the specific needs of the region. These responses seem to accept that the legal and petition-
ing system are of limited use in the current local government milieu, and aim to work around 
this. 
Naturally, however, there are many limits on this. Since the innovative methods described 
have not appeared to work well in dealing with larger-scale mass incidents, it is difficult to 
see that the particular distribution of funding which occurred in the Beiliu harmony associa-
tions could be applied to systems where mass incidents were more common: as the stability 
maintenance funds would presumably continue to be applied to “buying stability” in response 
to mass incidents, it is unlikely that grass-roots conflict resolution methods would be priori-
tised. Second, the problem of expertise remains considerable. This is so both in terms of the 
low capacity of local officials to resolve conflicts skilfully, which none of the proposed weiwen 
reforms really address, as well as in terms of the harmony association model, which requires 
that people of sufficient skill and standing in the community can be lured into performing diffi-
cult and controversial roles on the basis of relatively small sums of money—a situation 
which, while it appears to have happened in various places, cannot be said to be guarantee-
ably replicable across the whole of China.  
In a broader sense, while the debate about weiwen reform is has been approved of by the 
state at some level, the ideas promoted by such controversial figures as Yu Jianrong and 
Sun Liping are unlikely to form part of the mainstream thought processes of the party-state. 
Observation of the overall tendency of the Chinese state under Xi Jinping, as well as within 
the management of the stability maintenance scheme (for example, that the responsible min-
ister, Guo Shengkun, has a background in policing and business rather than in law), suggest 
that it is the authoritarian tendency and the financial tendency rather than negotiation or long-
term social planning which will rule in these cases. But even if we accept this point, it re-20 
 
mains true that experimentation is the fulcrum on which Chinese policy is often developed 
(see Heilmann, 2008), so that local innovation in stability maintenance practice cannot 
merely be ignored or conceptually marginalised. 
Conclusion 
On a fundamental level, this paper has aimed to study the weiwen phenomenon in and of 
itself. That is, it has attempted not to conflate “stability maintenance” as a series of organisa-
tions and practices with the pursuit of actions which are designed to increase the level of 
actual stability—however that can be measured—or to prevent the level of stability from be-
ing lowered. On both a practical and an epistemic level, these two things are linked but ulti-
mately discrete. Weiwen has become, and was likely intended as, an all-purpose tool for 
solving various social and political problems (in much the same way as petitioning was in the 
mid-2000s (Minzner, 2005)), in a context in which, through lack of resources and political will, 
legal methods have been marginalised. One of its uses has been conflict resolution at a local 
level, an area which has perhaps been ignored by other writers because it does not always fit 
into a larger picture of national political stability. 
The analysis of grassroots weiwen highlights a society which is struggling with low-level local 
conflicts and in which it is difficult to resolve problems other than by financial compensation 
or state violence. Stability maintenance does not address these problems in an overall 
sense, and in some ways it exacerbates them. Nor is stability maintenance at all compatible 
with legal development or the rule of law, harking back as it does to traditional interpersonal 
means of mediation characteristic of the Mao period and earlier. 
Nonetheless, considered at a grassroots level, the hypotheses posed about the effect of sta-
bility maintenance have been in part confirmed. It is clear that, although it may not be a fea-
sible option in the long term, stability maintenance bodies have brought more to the world of 
conflict resolution than just extra money: they have been able, in various ways and in various 
places, to improve the quality of negotiation in disputes, and to facilitate outcomes which 
involve more than just the transfer of sums of money. The data we collected seem to demon-
strate that, when the conflict is below “mass incident” level, the roles played by stability main-
tenance officials become increasingly flexible. This brings us to the issue of policy flexibility 
and innovation, in which this paper has demonstrated that local authorities have shown the 
capacity to respond to academic critiques of weiwen by creating innovative local means of 
resolving conflicts. 
None of the arguments made in this paper necessarily contradict the broader critique of wei-
wen mounted by the Western authors I cite. Rather, they demonstrate first that weiwen is a 
complicated organism difficult to generalise about, and second that weiwen, together with 
people’s mediation, is providing a means of local conflict resolution which fills a gap in local 
Chinese society which other organisations and strategic approaches, whether from the state 
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Appendix 
Stability maintenance and dispute resolution: a coding framework 
 
 
Databases:   Renmin Ribao database 
                Chinese Newspaper database (CNKI) 
                Chinese journal database (CNKI) 
                Google News 
Searches of web and SNS (tianya.cn, Weibo, etc.) 
      (in order of importance) 
 
Keywords:  Key search term: 维稳办 (weiwenban or stability maintenance office, 
abbreviated WWB) 
NB: Entries must relate to conflicts between multiple parties where a 
WWB attempted resolution. (Note the categories of conflict in item 13.) 
 




Notes on coding: text is entered in the spreadsheet either in Chinese (Ch), English (E), or in 
coded letters/number (Co). For the fields classifying complainants and complaints (11, 12, 
13, 15, 16), it will be possible to use multiple codes in single cells, in which case they should 
be placed in alphabetical order (eg, “ACP” for field 13). 
 
No  Field  Description  Ch/E/Co 
1  Entry number  Different for each line  Co 
2  Case number 
Different reports of single cases should 
have the same case number 
Co 
3  Media source  Newspaper (etc) name   Ch 
4  Media date  DMY  Co 
5  Media access date  Date last accessed by researcher. DMY  Co 
6  Media name   Headline, title, or other identifier  Ch 
7  Media citation  Web link or page number  Co 
8  Incident date  MY or DMY  Co 
9  Incident location  Village, county, and province  Ch 
10  Affiliation of relevant WWB  Village, county, or province  E 
11  Type of complainant 
I – individual 
C – collective of individuals (family 
group, unofficial organisation) 
Q – quasi-government organisation 
(such as ACWF, CYL, etc.) 
O – cadre (government 
employee/official) 





Type of entity complained 
about 
I – individual 
C – collective of individuals (family 
group, unofficial organisation) 
Q – quasi-government organisation 
(such as ACWF, CYL, etc.) 
O – cadre (government 
employee/official) 




Type of complaint made 
by complainant 
(NB: legal language is 
used here for the purposes 
of classification. It is not 
necessary that the 
“offences” are actually 
illegal, or that they can 
actually be found to have 
occurred.) 
A – physical offences against the per-
son (assault, etc.) 
T – financial offences (refusing to pay 
compensation, fines) 
P – offences relating to property (theft, 
misuse of space, demolition) 
C – contractual offences (refusal to 
honour agreements) 
R – offences based on personal 




Text description of 
complaint 




Time before WWB 
intervened 
In a few English words, the length of 
time that the conflict went on before the 
WWB intervened or was consulted (eg 
one week, one month, unknown, etc.) It 
may also be possible that the WWB 
intervened before a conflict began (that 






N – negotiation between parties is 
facilitated by WWB 
C – WWB pays compensation to 
complainant 
F – WWB requires complainant to pay 
L – WWB refers dispute to courts 
P – WWB refers dispute to police 





N – negotiation between parties is 
facilitated by WWB 
C – WWB pays compensation to 
accused 
F – WWB requires accused to pay 
L – WWB refers dispute to courts 
P – WWB refers dispute to police 
X – no resolution 
Co 




Degree of CCP 
involvement (as 
represented in the media) 
0 – not mentioned 
1 – alluded to 
2 – mentioned frequently 
Co 
20  Short-term outcome 
N – not resolved 
P – partly resolved 
R – resolved  
Co 
21 
Long-term outcome (if 
known) 
Text description  E 
22 
Text description of resolu-
tion/outcome 
A one-sentence English summary of 
the resolution 
E 
 
 